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Contribution in Antitrust Actions: Is
Fairness Reason Enough?
INTRODUCTION
Modern antitrust litigation is infamous for its complexity both
in terms of the number of parties brought before the court and
the issues to be resolved.' Because of current procedural difficul-
ties in managing major antitrust cases, courts are reluctant to
entertain new theories of liability which might interject addi-
tional complexity. 2 Measures taken to prevent further complica-
tion are, however, not always consonant with fairness between
1. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976), are the primary statutory sources for private enforcement of federal antitrust laws.
These statutory provisions proscribe, in very broad and general language, anticompeti-
tive business conduct. See L. SULIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 3 (1977).
Anticompetitive behavior is not defined more precisely because anticompetitive effects of
business practices vary within the confines of a particular industry. The burden of ana-
lyzing those practices challenged as anticompetitive, in the context of a particular indus-
try, falls on the courts, however, and has been cited as a source of substantive complex-
ity. See Blecher & Woodhead, The Small Prospects for Shrinking the Big Antitrust Case
by Procedural Reform, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 513, 517-25 (1978). The prevalence of large,
multiparty antitrust cases stems in part from the conspiratorial nature of many antitrust
violations. Allegations of conspiratorial price-fixing, a Sherman Act § 1 offense, are fre-
quently directed at pricing practices utilized industry-wide, or at least by a substantial
number of industry members in a particular geographic area. See, e.g., In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 80 F.R.D. 244 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (37 companies nation-wide sued
for allegedly participating in a price-fixing conspiracy); In re Plywood Anti-Trust Litig.,
76 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. La. 1976) (defendants named in suits according to geographic area).
Accordingly, both the size and substantive complexity of antitrust cases have been
attributed to the very nature of the antitrust violations.
2. An example of juidicial reluctance to further complicate antitrust proceedings is the
Supreme Court decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illiinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Illinois
Brick, the Court held that indirect purchasers of illegally over-priced products may not
pursue a treble damage action. In foreclosing indirect purchaser suits, the Court stressed
the increased complexity that would follow if it were necessary to determine to what
extent, if any, an illegal overcharge had been passed down the distribution chain rather
than simply absorbed by the first purchaser. Id. at 737-48. Thus, the Court exalted judi-
cial expediency over strict compliance with § 4 of the Clayton Act, the treble damage
provision. Section 4 authorizes recovery for any person who is damaged as the result of
illegal, anticompetitive acts, regardless of his or her position in a distribution chain. See
generally Newman, Limiting the Antitrust Damage Suit: The Emergence of a Policy
Against Complex Litigation, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 253 (1977); Note, Illinois Brick: The
Death Knell of Ultimate Consumer Antitrust Suits, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 421 (1978). See
also Blecher & Woodhead, supra note 1, at 515-17.
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the parties.3 The question of whether contribution 4 should be
available to antitrust defendants evidences this tension.5
Antitrust violators are jointly and severally liable6 for the bus-
iness injuries suffered by the plaintiff because of their illegal
conduct. An antitrust plaintiff need not sue all members of an
antitrust conspiracy, but may select his defendants.' Upon
3. Illinois Brick, for example, foreclosed suits by indirect purchasers without regard to
whether or not they suffered actual injury. As a result, indirect purchasers are without a
remedy even when the direct purchasers do not bring suit. After Illinois Brick, if direct
purchasers do not bring suit, the antitrust violation goes unsanctioned, and the party
actually suffering damage is without a remedy. See Newman, supra note 2, at 267-68.
4. Contribution is defined as the opportunity for joint tortfeasors to allocate the total
damages among the wrongdoers. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 50,
at 305-10 (4th ed. 1971). Contribution was recognized under English common law, but its
availability was limited by the rule of Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng.
Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Under the Merryweather rule, contribution was denied to inten-
tional tortfeasors, presumably because the court was unwilling to permit any mitigation
of damages for a deliberate wrongdoer. W. PROSSER, supra, § 50. American jurisdictions
interpreted Merryweather as imposing a general rule of no-contribution and did not dis-
tinguish between intentional and negligent torts. See Sullivan, New Perspectives in Anti-
trust Litigation: Toward a Right of Comparative Contribution, 1980 U. ILL L.F. 389, 392-
93; see generally Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L
REV. 130 (1932). Contribution is distinct from indemnification, which permits shifting the
entire loss from one tortfeasor to another, rather than allocating the loss between them.
See id. at 146-58.
5. Antitrust defendants have asserted contribution claims exclusively in the context
of private treble damage actions. See, e.g., Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Accordingly, this comment will focus on contribu-
tion in the context of private antitrust suits.
6. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968)
(White, J., concurring) ("A third party proving an illegal undertaking between two
defendants may recover for all damages caused by the combination. Those damages
normally may be had from either or both defendants without regard to their relative
responsibility .... "); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d
897, 904 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981) ("Antitrust coconspirators are jointly and severally liable for all dam-
ages caused by the conspiracy to which they were a party."); Wainwright v. Kraftco
Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("It is well settled that ... in multi-defendant
antitrust actions the co-conspirator joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable....").
7. See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 976 (1966) ("A plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose
to sue but one."); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("Thus, an
antitrust plaintiff may choose to sue but one of several co-conspirators ... and that one
co-conspirator will be responsible for the entire amount of damages caused by all.");
Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968)
("[Niumerous courts have held that an antitrust plaintiff need not sue all possible
defendants but may choose which of the conspirators he will make party to the action.");
see Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Coconspirators in
Contribution in Antitrust Actions
proving a violation, the plaintiff may collect the entire trebled"
damage award from any one defendant, or from those defend-
ants of his choice.9 Thus, one antitrust co-conspirator' may be
held liable for all resulting injury to the plaintiff, while other
co-conspirators completely escape liability." Many commenta-
tors perceive this imbalance as an inequity and therefore urge a
rule of antitrust contribution to assure fairness between the
parties.12
Contribution carries with it, however, a genuine threat of
increasing the complexity of antitrust proceedings. Under a con-
tribution rule, an antitrust defendant would be permitted to
Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L REV. 111, 114-17 (1962). See generally
Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal Anti-
trust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 779 (1979).
8. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the damages provision, provides in pertinent part:
"Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue... and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976).
9. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 144 (1968)
("[D]amages normally may be had from either or both defendants .... "); see also Corbett,
supra note 7, at 117.
10. Much of the conduct prOScribed by the antitrust laws involves two or more par-
ties acting in concert. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, for example, provides in pertinent
part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ... is hereby declared illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Accordingly, many private antitrust cases include conspiracy claims. See, e.g., In re Cor-
rugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979); see generally Corbett,
supra note 7.
11. Certain participants in an antitrust conspiracy may be intentionally overlooked
by a plaintiff because of an on-going business relationship. This situation was perceived
in two recent cases dealing with contribution in antitrust proceedings. In Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1979),-aff'd on reh'g en banc, 649
F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), out-of-court testimony indicated that several of the larger coconspir-
ators were omitted from the suit because the plaintiff was afraid of jeopardizing his
future business relations. See Note, Contribution and Antitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV.
890, 906 n.82 (1980). Similarly, in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty
Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979), the court alluded to possible improper motives
on the part of a plaintiff wholesaler who sued only a competing wholesaler, while alleg-
ing an illegal agreement between that wholesaler and the manufacturer. Apparently, the
plaintiff wholesaler had resumed business dealings with the manufacturer just prior to
filing suit. See Note, supra, at 905.
12. See, e.g., Floyd, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: A Question of Legal
Process, 1980 B.Y.U.L REv. 183 (1980); Jacobson, Contribution Among Antitrust Defend-
ants: A Necessary Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. Ft. L. REV. 217 (1980); Sulli-
van, supra note 4. See also Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.L.
REV. 669 (1980); Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions: Solution or Unmanage-
able Complexity? 1980 DE. C.L. REV. 1035 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Solution]. But
see Note, A Case Against Contribution in Antitrust, 58 TEx. L REv. 961 (1980).
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implead additional parties. 13 Accordingly, the liability issues
would necessarily expand to include a determination of which
third parties are liable for contribution 14 and what the contri-
buted share should be. 15
Proponents of an antitrust contribution rule consistently point
to available procedural safeguards, primarily the court's discre-
tionary severance power,16 as a solution for perceived problems
of increased complexity.' 7 Courts and commentators also note
that securities laws contain explicit provisions authorizing con-
tribution.' 8 They suggest that securities cases share the same
potential for complexity in terms of economic issues and large,
multiparty proceedings that is present in antitrust cases.' 9 Sup-
13. The current contribution proposal under consideration by Congress explicitly
authorizes third-party claims for contribution. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(a)
(1982). Additionally, even if the legislative proposal made no specific authorization, it is
clear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit contribution to be asserted by
means of third-party claims. FED. R. Civ. P. 14. See J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.03 [3] (2d ed. 1976).
14. Only impleaded parties found to be jointly liable for the plaintiffs injury are sub-
ject to contribution clair is. See supra note 4.
15. The proper standard for determining contribution shares is the subject of much
debate. The only court decision touching on the proper contribution formula in an anti-
trust context stated that the damages should be allocated on a pro rata basis among all
defendants and those third parties found liable for contribution. Professional Beauty
Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979).
Commentators, however, have advocated alternative methods. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra
note 4 (calling for a contribution formula based on comparative fault). The current pro-
posal in Congress calls for contribution "according to the damages attributable to each
such person's sales or purchases of goods or services." See infra note 79.
16. Rule 42(b) authorizes severance of third-party claims where necessary "in further-
ance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b).
17. The availability of severance has been relied on by courts and commentators and
recognized by Congress in advocating a contribution rule. See Professional Beauty
Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e
are confident that such problems can be avoided by the district court's prudent use of its
power to sever where necessary to insure justice."); Jacobson, supra note 12; Note, Solu-
tion, supra note 12, at 1051. See also The Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings on
S.1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1979) (statement by John Shenefield,
Asst. Attorney General) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Hearings].
18. Both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1976), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1976), contain express contribution provi-
sions. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
19. See Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1185 ("[C]ontribution is allowed by statute
under certain sections of the Security Acts, and security cases are often as complex as
antitrust cases.") See also Jacobson, supra note 12, at 235. For a general reference to the
complexity of securities cases, see Janofsky, The "Big Case": A "Big Burden" on Our
Courts, 66 A.B.A. J. 848 (1980).
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porters of an antitrust contribution rule offer the securities anal-
ogy to show that fears of unmanageable complexity are un-
founded and do not support a continued prohibition of contribu-
tion in antitrust proceedings. 20
This comment will examine the validity of this securities anal-
ogy. First, the current status of the contribution issue will be dis-
cussed and the scope and development of the competing policy
arguments presented. The discussion will then focus on the com-
plexity issues, examining the perceived areas where contribution
would further complicate antitrust proceedings. Next, asserted
claims for contribution under the securities laws will be surveyed
to see how the courts have sought to deal procedurally with the
threat of prejudice to the plaintiff resulting from increased com-
plexity. Finally, the validity of the analogy will be specifically exam-
ined, with the distinctions between antitrust and securities cases
offered to show that the analogy is an unpersuasive one.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONTRIBUTION DEBATE
Currently, antitrust defendants may not claim contribution. 21
Because the antitrust laws contain no provision authorizing con-
tribution, much of the judicial debate has centered on whether
antitrust policy might suffer or be better served by implying such
a right.
Judicial Development of a No-Contribution Rule:
A Policy Debate
The courts have looked to federal law to determine whether
contribution might be implied in antitrust cases. 22 Federal
common law prohibits contribution among tortfeasors absent
20. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 69 (prepared statement of Donald G.
Kempf, Jr.) See generally Jacobson, supra note 12; Note, Contribution Among Private
Antitrust Conspirators, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 342 (1980); Note, Carve-Out Answer to the
Contribution Question in Private Antitrust Litigation, 58 WASH. U.LQ. 975 (1980).
21. Although Congress has been considering an antitrust contribution rule since 1979,
no formal provision has yet been enacted. See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
The power of the courts to imply a right of contribution among antitrust defendants has
recently been foreclosed by the decision in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981). See infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
22. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). The
majority of courts deciding the availability of contribution in antitrust cases assumed
that federal law controlled and did not address the choice of law question. See, e.g., In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979); In re Ampicillin
Antitrust Litig., 82 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D.D.C. 1979); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Pres-
1983]
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specific enabling legislation. 23 Prior to 1979, only two district
courts had directly decided the availability of contribution in
antitrust cases.24 Both courts held that the absence of enabling
provisions in the antitrust laws indicated congressional intent
not to permit contribution.25 The two courts, however, accorded
different weight to congressional silence.
The first decision briefly addressed policy considerations other
than congressional silence. The court noted that contribution
might result in impediments to settlement 26 or in the plaintiff's
loss of control over the scope of the lawsuit.27 The court placed
primary emphasis, however, on the absence of enabling provi-
sions in the antitrust laws. Because Congress had included con-
tribution provisions in other statutory schemes, the absence of
such provisions from the antitrust laws implied that Congress
had intended to omit them.28
ident Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Some courts, however, were
asked by defendants seeking contribution to specifically address the question, in light of
the state court trend toward liberalizing the availability of contribution. See Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370, 1373 n.5 (10th Cir. 1979), aff'd on reh'g
en banc, 649 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); El Camino Glass Co. v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533, at 72, 112 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1976). For a comprehensive
inquiry into the choice of law question, see Sellers, Contribution in Antitrust Damage
Actions, 24 ViLL L REv. 829 (1979).
23. The Supreme Court first articulated a no-contribution rule in Union Stock Yards
Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 224 (1905) ("[Tlhe general princi-
ple of law is well settled that one of several wrongdoers cannot recover against another
wrongdoer, although he may have been compelled to pay all the damages for the wrong
done."). Subsequently, in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282 (1952), the Court reaffirmed its position, noting that any dissatisfaction with the
rule might best be remedied by legislative action. Id. at 286. Proponents of an antitrust
contribution rule criticize judicial reliance on these precedents. It is suggested that the
Union Stock Yards limitation is only dicta and Halcyon only an admiralty decision, both
inappropriate precedents for general federal law. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 392-96.
24. El Camino Glass Co. v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 28, 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp.
1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The question of contribution among antitrust defendants had been
previously raised, but addressed only indirectly by the courts. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shu-
bert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960) (alleged illegal conduct held not to be joint activity, so
contribution issue inapplicable); Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 234 F.2d
616 (4th Cir. 1956) (dicta suggests contribution between antitrust defendants might be
available under state law).
25. El Camino Glass Co. v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533, at
72,112 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28,1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd.,
298 F. Supp. 1339, 1345-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
26. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1345-46.
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The second contribution decision 29 treated congressional si-
lence as just one of several policy considerations. 30 The court
reiterated the potential for plaintiffs loss of control and deter-
rence to settlement. Additionally, the court voiced a concern over
increasing the complexity of already complex proceedings. 31 The
court rejected the suggestion that unintentional antitrust viola-
tors be treated differently 32 and, in sum, deemed the policy
arguments important grounds on which to base the denial of
contribution.33
The above decisions provided the only available precedent
when, in 1979, the first appellate decision on contribution issued.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the conclusions reached by prior
courts on the policy issues. In Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,34 the court held that fairness
between the parties precluded a rigid rule denying contribution
to antitrust defendants. 35
The plaintiff in Professional Beauty was a beauty supply whole-
saler, who sued a competing wholesaler, National, when a beauty
products manufacturer terminated Professional's franchise in
order to give National exclusive distribution rights to the manu-
facturer's product lines.36 The complaint alleged that National
and the manufacturer, La Maur, were parties to an illegal con-
spiracy to monopolize, by means of an exclusive distributorship.37
29. El Camino Glass Co. v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 18, 1976).
30. Id. at 72,112.
31. Id.
32. Most antitrust violations are characterized as intentional torts. See Professional
Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1189 (Hanson, J., dissenting). See also Sellers, supra note 22, at 829
n.6. Some courts recognize, however, that certain antitrust violations may be merely due
to negligence. See Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Products, Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1006-07 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975). Antitrust defendants have offered the distinction
between intentional and unintentional antitrust violations as a means to avoid the per-
ceived common law ban on contribution among tortfeasors. Those seeking contribution
point out that the source of the general no-contribution rule, the Merryweather case, was
incorrectly applied to unintentional torts. See supra note 4. Therefore, any general rule
against contribution should apply only to intentional torts. See El Camino Glass Co. v.
Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,111 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1976)
See also Sullivan, supra note 4, at 404-05.
33. El Camino Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,112.
34. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 1185.
36. Id. at 1181.
37. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), prohibits monopolization or
attempted monopolization in any particular line of commerce. Generally, a manufacturer
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 14
National, however, was the only defendant named in the law-
suit.38 National then filed a third-party complaint against La
Maur, alleging that any illegality was the product of joint activ-
ity and seeking contribution should it be found liable to Pro-
fessional.3 9
Under those facts, the Eighth Circuit found unpersuasive prior
policy arguments for denying contribution. The court
initially rejected the argument that congressional failure to pro-
vide for contribution in the antitrust laws meant that Congress
did not intend to permit contribution among antitrust defend-
ants.40 The court reevaluated prior policy arguments in terms
of whether allowing contribution for fairness purposes would
impair the overall statutory purposes of the antitrust laws. The
court balanced claims that contribution would prejudice antitrust
plaintiffs, deter settlement, and add to the complexity of litiga-
tion against the fairness argument,41 and concluded that the
competing policies of fairness to litigants and deterrence of anti-
trust violations required that contribution be allowed in certain
circumstances. 42 The Eighth Circuit authorized contribution on
may restrict the distribution of his products and may unilaterally terminate an existing
distributor without incurring antitrust liability. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300 (1919). When the manufacturer possesses monopoly power in the relevant product
market, or when the manufacturer conspires to achieve monopoly power, then acts taken
to further that unlawful goal, such as termination of a dealer, may violate § 2. See, e.g.,
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (private utility company, a
monopolist, which refused to permit competitors to wheel power through its transmission
lines, and then tried by buy out all competitors who could not transmit power through
alternative channels, found to have violated § 2). See generally 2 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION, § 6C.0213] (1969).
38. Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1181.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1183-84.
41. Id. at 1184-85.
42. The court explicitly stated that fairness was the lynchpin in its decision to permit
contribution. Id. at 1185. Contribution is clearly an equitable notion designed to promote
fairness. See generally Leflar, supra note 4. The court was on more uncertain ground,
however, in asserting that contribution would enhance the deterrent purposes of the anti-
trust laws. As the dissenting judge pointed out, "the arguments on either side of the
deterrence question are inconclusive." 594 F.2d at 1189 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
The competing positions on the economics of deterrence are as follows. Proponents of
an antitrust contribution rule maintain that contribution will result in more certain liabil-
ity, because participants in an illegal conspiracy will no longer escape liability if not sued
by the plaintiff. This more certain liability would deter illegal activity. See Corbett, supra
note 7, at 137; Jacobson, supra note 12, at 233-34; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 412. Oppo-
nents of contribution counter with the suggestion that business is generally risk averse.
Contribution in Antitrust Actions
a case-by-case basis, but left the determination of when and how
contribution was to be applied to the discretion of the trial
court.
4 3
Following Professional Beauty, the contribution debate began
in earnest.44 The Professional Beauty decision essentially set out
the policy arguments, balancing fairness to litigants against the
potential for increased complexity and deterrence to settlement. 45
In discussing these policies, commentators expressed an overrid-
ing concern with the fairness issue, usually dictating the conclu-
sion that contribution should be uniformly allowed. 46
Courts, however, consistently declined to follow the Eighth Cir-
cuit's lead. Both the Fifth and Tenth Circuits rejected contribu-
tion claims,47 and lower courts distinguished rather than fol-
See Genovese, The Case Against Contribution and Claim Reduction, 20 ANTITRUST LAw 4
(Ill. St. Bar Ass'n Apr., 1982). Although contribution might prevent participants in an
illegal scheme from escaping liability, each conspirator's share of resulting damages
would be much smaller even though more certain. The smaller, more predictable liability
could be planned for as a necessary business cost of participating in an illegal scheme.
Thus, contribution might impede deterrence by removing the immense threat of sole lia-
bility for an entire trebled damage award. For opposing economic analyses of the deter-
rence question, see Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust
Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J. LAw & ECON. 331 (1980) (risk aversion
suggests contribution will minimize deterrent purpose of the antitrust laws); but see
Polinsky & Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An
Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1981) (contribution would enhance deterrence in
antitrust).
43. Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1186.
44. Prior to 1979 and the Professional Beauty decision, very little scholarly commen-
tary was available on the subject of contribution in antitrust proceedings. See Corbett,
supra note 7; Paul, Contribution and Indemnification Among Antitrust Coconspirators
Revisited, 41 FORDHAM L REV. 67 (1972); Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 682 (1978). Following Professional Beauty, however, commentary flour-
ished. See supra notes 4, 7, 12.
45. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 4. Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Co-conspira-
tors, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749 (1980).
46. See Corbett, supra note 7; Jacobson, supra note 12; Ponsoldt & Terry, Contribution
in Civil Antitrust Litigation: The Emerging Consensus in Legal Literature, 38 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 315 (1981); Sullivan, supra note 4. See also Note, Contribution Among Anti-
trust Violators, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 669 (1980); Note, Antitrust Policy, supra note 11. But
see Sellers, supra note 22 (contribution should not be permitted against settling defend-
ants); Note, A Case Against Contribution in Antitrust, 58 TEK_ L REv. 961 (1980).
47. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Co. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979),
aff'd sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (fairness
and policy arguments offered in support of contribution rule not sufficiently compelling
so that courts should imply such a right as a matter of federal common law); Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,649 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1979), aff'd on reh'g en banc.
649 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (in light of sufficiently offsetting policy arguments on both
19831
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lowed Professional Beauty.48 These later decisions suggested
that fairness, and arguably deterrence, 49 did not so conclusively
outweigh concerns over potential prejudice to plaintiffs and
increasingly complex litigation.
The debate over contribution has shifted forums, and is now
conducted primarily in Congress. This shift was necessitated by
the only Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue of contribu-
tion in antitrust proceedings. In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc.,50 the Court held that the federal courts lack the
power to imply a right of contribution under the antitrust laws.51
Federal common law is appropriate to broaden and define anti-
trust violations, for such judicial shaping is necessary to give
purpose to the overall statutory scheme. 52 The remedial provi-
sions of the antitrust laws, however, are sufficiently defined as
set forth in the statute.53 Accordingly, the Court held that it
would be an improper use of federal common law to imply a
right of contribution, for such a right would substantially alter
the remedial scheme as originally enacted.54
As a result of the Texas Industries decision, recognition of a
right of contribution between antitrust defendants must await
affirmative congressional action. Active congressional debate
began on the contribution issue, well before the Supreme Court
conclusively established that legislative action alone could effect
such a change.
sides of the contribution issue, the availability of contribution to antitrust defendants is
more appropriately a legislative determination).
48. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,059 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (letter opinion) (release clause in pretrial settlement agreement,
purporting to release settling defendants from contribution claims, is valid as against
non-settling defendants); Hedges Enters. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,717 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (defendants' leave to amend complaint to include contri-
bution claim denied on the ground that there is no right to contribution from settling
defendants); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(contribution not appropriate in complex class action such as this one where cross-claims
by 37 defendants would require liberal severance and result in duplication of judicial time
and effort); In re Ampicillin Antiturst Litig., 82 F.R.D. 647 (D.D.C. 1979) (amendment of
complaint to include contribution claim not proper against co-defendants settling in good
faith-not the same situation as that addressed in Professional Beauty).
49. See supra note 42.
50. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
51. Id. at 646-47.
52. Id. at 643. See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134(1968).
53. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 643-44.
54. Id.
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The Contribution Debate in Congress
Congressional action on the contribution issue began shortly
after the Professional Beauty decision in 1979. A bill was intro-
duced in the Senate that proposed to amend section 4 of the
Clayton Act55 to authorize contribution in price-fixing cases.56
The restricted scope of the bill, however, suggests that Profes-
sional Beauty did not provide the motivating force behind the
proposed legislation. The antitrust violation alleged in Profes-
sional Beauty was attempted monopolization, premised on an
exclusive distributorship between a manufacturer and a whole-
saler.57 The legislative proposal authorized contribution only in
price-fixing cases and thus did not address the factual situation
present in Professional Beauty.58 Another case, In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litigation,59 offered Congress a more com-
pelling factual setting around which to center a contribution
debate.
The Corrugated Container case grew out of a federal grand
jury proceeding in which fourteen companies and twenty-six
individuals were indicted for participating in a price-fixing con-
spiracy. 60 Following the government investigation, over forty
private class action suits were filed against thirty-seven con-
tainer companies representing over seventy percent of the con-
tainer industry nation-wide. 61 Progressive settlements ensued,
by which defendants who settled early paid a smaller proportion
55. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), is the general damage provi-
sion, authorizing treble damages for any party injured as a result of antitrust violations.
See supra note 8.
56. The first contribution proposal, introduced by Senator Birch Bayh, was offered
initially as an amendment to S.390, an antitrust procedural reform measure under con-
sideration by the Senate. See Note, supra note 11, at 899 n.53. The bill was reintroduced
subsequently as S.1468, and eventually reported favorably out of committee. See S. REP.
No. 428, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979).
57. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
58. See S. REP. No. 428,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Shortly after the Bayh bill, S.1468,
was introduced, the American Bar Association offered a counterproposal authorizing
contribution for all types of antitrust violations. American Bar Assoc. Report of the Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law with Legislative Recommendation, reprinted in ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 936, at E-1 (Oct. 25, 1979).
59. 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979), cert. dismissed sub nom. Westvaco Corp. v. Adams
Extract Co., 449 U.S. 915 (1980).
60. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,690,
at 77,882 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
61. For a discussion of the facts of the Container case, see Jacobson, supra note 12, at
221.
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of their estimated market share than later settling defendants.62
By 1979, almost all the defendants had opted to settle.63 The fol-
lowing year, when the jury returned the untrebled damage ver-
dict, only one defendant remained.64
Although virtually all of the Container defendants had settled,
the plaintiffs' damage claims were not significantly reduced by
each successive settlement.65 Accordingly, when the jury issued
its verdict, the remaining defendant was found liable for indus-
try-wide damages to the plaintiffs, even though the company's
own market share was insignificant. The jury verdict, untrebled,
was $350,000,000.66
The first contribution proposal was introduced in the Senate at
roughly the same time that the court in Corrugated Container
gave preliminary approval to the first major settlement agree-
ment.67 This agreement operated to remove twenty-three of the
thirty-seven named defendants from the lawsuit. Consequently,
the potential liability of the remaining defendants ballooned,
and pressure to alleviate the perceived inequity was directed at
Congress. 68
62. The progressive settlements in the Container litigation prompted many allega-
tions that the settlements were coerced. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 32
(case study of the effect of coerced settlements on Green Bay Packing, Inc., one of the
smaller companies named in the Container litigation). The precise details of the settle-
ment arrangements, including the difference in settlement figures paid by early settling
defendants, are discussed in Jacobson, supra note 12, at 220-22. See also In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,114 (S.D. Tex 1981) (final
approval of settlement agreement and findings of fact).
63. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,690
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (preliminary approval of the settlement agreement between plaintiffs and
23 defendants).
64. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 205 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Mead Corporation was the sole non-settling defendant when the civil jury trial com-
menced).
65. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfiord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957),
set the rule for adjusting an antitrust plaintiffs judgment to reflect prejudgment settle-
ments. Under the Flintkote rule, any amounts received through settlement were deducted
from the plaintiffs eventual judgment only after that judgment had been trebled. Thus,
even if a settlement reflected the actual damages attributable to the settling defendant,
non-settling defendants would still be liable for the difference between the actual settle-
ment amount and that amount trebled. See Salzman, The Effect of Contribution on Lit-
igation and Settlement: The Plaintiff's Viewpoint, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593, 1594-95 (1979).
66. See Jacobson, supra note 12, at 221.
67. The first contribution proposal was introduced in the Senate in May of 1979. See
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 917 at B-1 (June 7, 1979). The court's prelimi-
nary approval of the first major settlement agreement occurred in May of the same year.
See supra note 60.
68. References to the Container case appear throughout the Senate Hearings on the
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The relationship between Corrugated Container and the form
of the proposed contribution rule is evident from an examination
of the bill's provisions. First, the bill tailors the availability of
contribution to price-fixing cases only.6 9 Second, the bill has
been characterized as authorizing limits on the liability of any
one defendant rather than as a true contribution bill.7 0 The bill
provides for contribution, but focuses primarily on the effect of
settlement on nonsettling defendants.7 1 Under the bill, the
plaintiffs damage claim would be reduced by the greatest of the
amount of the settlement, a specific figure stipulated in the set-
tlement agreement, or the actual treble damages attributable to
the settling defendant.7 2 Such a provision precludes a repeat of
the Corrugated Container situation, where a few non-settling
defendants in an industry-wide suit were held liable for the
damages attributable to the market share of settled defendants
as well as their own.73
The form of the initial contribution proposal introduced in the
Senate suggests that congressional consideration of the contri-
bution issue was likely prompted by the Corrugated Container
case. The actual debate in Congress, however, was more broadly
based. Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee covered
the same policy arguments that had been raised by courts and
commentators considering a general contribution rule.7 4 The
contribution proposal. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 32 (Green Bay Pack-
ing, Inc. case study); at 126 (Green Bay Packing, Inc. letter of support); at 174 (letter of
support by Westvaco Corp., another Container defendant). See also supra note 62. See
generally Jacobson, supra note 12.
69. There has been no explanation for confining a right of contribution to price-fixing
cases. Courts deciding the contribution issue were more reticent to foreclose contribution
where the wrongdoing was unintentional. See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Co. v. Texas
Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) ("I would not force a defendant guilty of no conscious
wrongdoing to bear total responsibility for the sins of many.") (Morgan, J., dissenting);
Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370, 1377 (10th Cir. 1979), aff'd on
reh'g en banc, 649 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (declining to permit contribution in the
context of an intentional tort, but suggesting, in dicta, a possible exception for uninten-
tional antitrust violators). Price fixing, however, is viewed as an intentional tort. See
Sellers, supra note 22, at 830 n.6.
70. See Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 669, 680-82
(1980).
71. See S. RaP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41 (1979). The current bill, with nearly
identical provisions, is quoted infra note 79.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
74. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 30.
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notion of fairness to antitrust defendants, especially smaller,
more vulnerable companies, 75 was weighed against deterrence,
settlement and complexity concerns.76
Although the general consensus of those testifying at the hear-
ing was that caution and further deliberation were required,77
the bill, as originally proposed, was favorably voted out of com-
mittee and onto the Senate floor. 78 The full Senate took no
action, however, before the Ninety-sixth Congress formally ad-
journed.
Essentially the same contribution bill is currently on the
Senate's agenda. 79 Its predecessor in the Ninety-seventh Con-
gress, S. 995, had been favorably voted out of committee, but its
75. Id. at 32 (Green Bay Packing case study--effect of coerced settlements on a small
antitrust defendant).
76. Id. at 8 (testimony of John Shenefield, Asst. Attorney General); at 52-54 (statement
of David Shapiro concerning likely complications to result from a contribution rule).
77. See id. at 30 (prepared statement of John Shenefield, Asst. Attorney General).
78. See S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
79. The text of the current bill, S.380 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress Assembled, That the Clayton Act, (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 4H the following new section:
Sec. 41.(a) Two or more persons who are subject to liability for damages
attributable to an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices under section 4,
4A, or 4C of the Act may claim contribution among them according to the
damages attibutable to each such person's sales or purchases of goods or ser-
vices. A claim for contribution by such person or persons agaist whom an
action has been commenced may be asserted by cross-claim, counterclaim,
third-party claim, or in a separate action, whether or not an action has been
brought or a judgment has been rendered against the persons from whom con-
tribution is sought.
(b) A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received in
settlement by one of two or more persons subject to contribution under this
section shall not discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms
expressly so provide. The court shall reduce the claim of the person giving the
release or covenant against other persons subject to liability by the greatest of:
(1) any amount stipulated by the release or covenant, (2) the amount of consid-
eration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to the settling
person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3) above, actual
damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of the Act.
(c) A release or covenant, or an agreement which provides for a release or
covenant, entered into in good faith, relieves the recipient from liability to any
other person for contribution, with respect to the claim of the person giving the
release or covenant, or agreement, unless the settlement provided for in any
such release, covenant, or agreement is not consummated.
(d) Nothing in this section shall affect the joint and several liability of any
person who enters into an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices.
(e) This section shall apply to all actions under section 4, 4A, or 4C or the Act
commenced after the date of enactment of this section.
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sponsors could not muster sufficient support from the full Senate
for passage. 80 Two similar contribution bills had been intro-
duced in the House during the Ninety-seventh Congress, but like
their Senate counterpart, made little progress beyond the House
committees."'
Congress is presently under no immediate pressure to resolve
the contribution issue.8 2 A Corrugated Container situation, how-
ever, is likely to arise again. Private treble damage actions have
dramatically increased in recent years.8 3 So long as effective
private enforcement continues to place the threat of sole liability
on one of several antitrust co-conspirators, the pressure to recog-
nize some form of contribution will continue to surface.
Extensive congressional reliance on a Corrugated Container
type situation in formulating a contribution rule may, however,
(f)(1) The claim reduction principle of subsection (b) of this section shall also
apply to actions alleging an agreement to fix, maintain, or stabilize prices
under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act which are pending on the date of enact-
ment of this section, if upon proof by any party subject to liability for damages
in such an action, the court determines that it would be inequitable, in light of
all the circumstances and notwithstanding subsection (f)(2), not to apply the
principle in that action. In ruling on a request to apply claim reduction, the
court shall find the facts specially.
(2) No agreement to settle, compromise, or release a claim under section 4,
4A, or 4C of this Act which has been signed by the parties prior to the date of
enactment of this section may be rescinded, disapproved, reformed, or modified
by the parties or by the court because of the application of the claim reduction
principle, except upon the written consent of all the parties thereto.
(g) Each subsection of this section is severable from all other subsections, and
the invalidity of any subsection for any reason shall not affect the validity of
the remaining subsections: Provided, That subsections (f) (1) and (f) (2) are not
severable from each other, and the invalidity of any provision of those subsec-
tions as applied in an action shall render the remainder of those subsections
inapplicable in that action.
80. See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) for a copy of the bill in the precise
form recommended to the Senate. See also supra note 79. The contribution provision
under consideration by the 97th Congress, S. 995, had been amended in April of 1982 to
apply retroactively. See supra note 79, § (f)(1). Although S. 995 had been heavily lobbied
and fairly well received, Senate members disapproved of the retroactive application of the
bill, and a filibuster prevented its passage. See 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 1093, at 1055 (Dec. 9, 1982). The current contribution bill, S.380, is precisely the same
as the ill-fated S.995.
81. See H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H.189 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1982)
(introduced by Congressman Brooks) and H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc.
H.4111 (daily ed. July 8, 1981) (introduced by Congressmen Evans and Hartnett).
82. The last remaining defendant in the Container litigation reached a settlement
with the plaintiffs prior to a judgment being finalized. See 43 ANTrrRUsT & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1081, at 443 (Sept. 16, 1982).
83. See Jacobson, supra note 12, at 219-21.
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present some dangers. Certainly, the coerced settlements and
potential for industry-wide liability, evidenced by this case, pre-
sent compelling fairness arguments. Accordingly, congressional
efforts and research have been directed at creating a contribu-
tion rule which could alleviate some unfairness without under-
mining broader antitrust policy goals. The emphasis on substan-
tive concerns has, however, resulted in unequal, almost cursory
treatment of complexity issues.8 4 Both proponents and oppo-
nents in the contribution debate have devoted very little time to
the possible complications contribution might create in litigating
an antitrust case before settlement is a realistic possibility.
Proponents of a contribution rule, in courts, commentary, and
Congress, minimize concerns over increased complexity, point-
ing to the courts' power to sever claims and parties to prevent
any prejudice to a plaintiff.8 5 Additionally, such proponents
refer to the contribution provisions found in the securities laws.
They suggest that the presence of a contribution rule in the
securities area has presented no unmanageable administrative
problems.8 6 These proponents offer little more to support this
claim, however, other than the analogy itself.
The complexity issues, in all likelihood, are subordinated to
fairness arguments and other substantive policy concerns be-
cause the problems engendered by complexity will not arise until
after a contribution rule is implemented. A post hoc considera-
tion of complexity problems is a questionable approach; espe-
cially since Congress is currently in the position to formulate a
comprehensive contribution scheme which addresses such con-
cerns within the framework of the contribution rule. The com-
plexity concerns pose serious questions in their own right, and
therefore warrant expanded treatment.
PREDICTED COMPLICATIONS RESULTING FROM A CONTRIBUTION
RULE IN ANTITRUST CASES
Under the current proposal for a contribution rule in antitrust
84. The almost uniform response to warnings of increased complexity has been
reliance upon judicial power to sever claims and parties, and the fact that contribution in
the securities field has resulted in no managerial problems. See Professional Beauty, 594
F.2d at 1185; 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 69 (prepared statement of Donald
G. Kempf, Jr.); see also supra notes 18-19.
85. See supra notes 16-17.
86. See supra notes 18-19.
[Vol. 14
Contribution in Antitrust Actions
cases,87 two factors threaten to further complicate the litigation
of antitrust claims. First, contribution claims may be asserted
against parties who were not named in the plaintiffs suit.88 Sec-
ond, once these impleaded parties are before the court, questions
as to their participatory liability and their appropriate contrib-
uted share must be addressed.89 Both factors operate to present
an antitrust plaintiff with a lawsuit potentially well beyond the
scope of that which he or she undertook when filing the initial
claim.90
According to traditional tort principles, a tortfeasor's right to
claim contribution does not arise until after his liability to the
plaintiff has been established and he has paid out more than his
share of the damages.91 Thus, a plaintiff would not be burdened
with proving liability on the part of third parties impleaded by
the defendant. Rather, the defendant would be required to prove
the joint liability of those parties from whom contribution is
sought in a separate, subsequent proceeding.
Current procedural measures, however, permit contribution
claims to be asserted by means of cross-claims or third-party
pleadings during the original suit giving rise to potential liabili-
ty.92 Permitting an adjudication of contribution in such a fashion
burdens the original plaintiff because any judgment must await
the named defendants' proof as to the joint liability of impleaded
third parties.
Courts initially deciding on the availability of contribution in
antitrust proceedings have voiced concern over the potential for
increased complexity likely to result from liberal impleader
rules.93 The mere possibility that, through impleader, a defend-
87. The current proposal is quoted at supra note 79.
88. Section 41(a) of the proposed bill, S.380, authorizes third-party claims as a means
to assert a contribution claim.
89. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
90. Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting). See also Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
91. See W. PROSSER supra note 4, § 50. See generally Leflar, supra note 4.
92. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a per-
son not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against him.
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
93. See El Camino Glass Co. v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533,
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ant could significantly expand the size of the lawsuit might deter
plaintiffs from filing suit.94 Courts also have noted the deterrent
effect of factors other than increased size. 95 An im-
pleaded defendant might have substantially greater resources to
defend and delay a suit.96 Similarly, an impleaded party might
occupy a different position in the pertinent market 97 or have a
distinct type of involvement in the alleged conspiracy from the
defendants originally named. 98 Finally, the potential for a
change in venue necessitated by impleader of geographically
diverse third-party defendants and the increase in litigation
costs likely to result also provide potential for deterrence. 99
In addition to the threat of a chilling effect on private enforce-
ment,100 recognition of a contribution rule in antitrust cases
suggests further complications in the context of managing the
additional parties and corresponding issues once they are before
the court. Courts have recognized that contribution will inject
additional issues into a lawsuit that is already enormously
complex. 101
Contribution claims are permissible only where it can be
shown that the impleaded party is jointly liable with the original
defendants.10 2 Consequently, impleader of third parties neces-
sitates expanded discovery so that the defendant can prove the
liability of any third parties. Once joint liability is established,
the proper contribution share must be determined. 10 3 Such a
at 72,112 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
94. Sabre Shipping, 298 F. Supp. at 1346.
95. Id. See also Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
96. Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id. See also 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 62 (prepared statement of
Lowell Sachnoff).
99. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 142 (statement of Donald J. Polden).
100. See infra note 111.
101. See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir.
1979), aff'd on reh g en banc, 649 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Wilson P. Abraham Constr.
v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Texas Indus.,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1190
(Hanson, J., dissenting).
102. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 309; Corbett, supra note 7, at 114-17. See
also supra note 14.
103. The difficulty of proof will depend on the allocation method ultimately selected.
For example, if contribution shares are allocated on a pro rata basis, a court would only
have to divide the final judgment by the number of defendants and contributing parties.
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determination places an additional burden on the plaintiff, for
the final judgment must be delayed until the appropriate contri-
bution formula is applied. 0 4 Where contribution shares are cal-
culated according to each responsible defendant's actual sales or
purchases, 10 5 rather than on a pro rata basis,10 6 substantial
investment of judicial time and effort, as well as additional costs
to the plaintiff, would result.
One final area where a contribution rule would further compli-
cate antitrust proceedings concerns the current use of joint
defense teams during the pendency of a major antitrust case. 10 7
Through impleader, any defendant could bring into the proceed-
ings those co-conspirators whom the plaintiff declined to name
at the outset. These co-conspirators, who would otherwise be
uninvolved in the lawsuit, might be very unwilling to cooperate
with the named defendants, the very parties responsible for their
presence in court.108 Animosity between antitrust defendants
who would otherwise have complementary goals would be inev-
itable. The streamlined defense efforts which result from cooper-
ation among defendants and eliminate duplicative efforts on the
part of counsel may be hampered by recognition of a contribu-
tion rule. 10 9 For the plaintiff, this lack of cooperative effort
See Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1182 n.4. If, however, a comparative fault or com-
parative benefit approach is taken, more in-depth judicial scrutiny is required. See Sulli-
van, supra note 4, at 416-23. See also supra note 15.
104. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 29 (prepared statement of John
Shenefield, Asst. Attorney General).
105. S.380, the currently pending bill, provides for contribution based upon actual
sales or purchases. See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41(a) (1982). See also supra
note 79. Such a formula has been criticized because of the time and consequent litigation
costs necessary for a determination of the actual sales of all defendants or contributing
parties. See 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 62 (prepared statement of Lowell
Sachnoff); at 137 (statement of Donald J. Polden).
106. See supra notes 14, 103.
107. See Clinton, The Law of Contribution: Its Common Law Origins and Current
Status in Federal Litigation, 48 ANTrrRUsT LJ. 1588 (1979). Joint defense teams permit
coordination of defense efforts so that counsel may introduce motions on behalf of all
defendants rather than having each defendant litigate his own case.
108. See Cellini, The Effect of Contribution on Litigation and Settlement: The
Defendant's Viewpoint, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1599, 1603-04 (1979) (defendants might become
more interested in searching out "potential co-conspirators," so as to lessen any eventual
judgment, than in cooperating in any defense efforts).
109. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.RD. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(mem.) ("Further complications to the efficient management of a suit such as this would
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among the defendants presents further delays wholly uncon-
nected with the merits of his claim.
Proponents of a contribution rule suggest that procedural pro-
tections, such as liberal use of a court's discretionary severance
power, offset threats of deterrence and administrative complexi-
ties arising in the actual litigation of contribution issues.110
Courts, however, have characterized the severance power as an
uncertain, and hence inadequate, remedy.'
Severance power under rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is exercised at the court's discretion.112 Thus, the pos-
sibility that contribution claims and the additional parties
involved therein would not be readily severed from the original
cause might be sufficient to deter effective private enforcement. 13
Furthermore, severance of parties and issues may be unlikely
where the contribution claims involve liability issues substan-
tially similar to those being litigated in the primary suit.114 In
spite of the above problems, proponents of a contribution rule
suggest that the fears of increased complexity are exaggerated.
Contribution is permitted in cases brought under the securities
laws and, arguably, securities cases offer the same potential for
multiple parties and complex economic issues present in anti-
trust cases." 5 Contribution supporters point to the absence of
demonstrable problems in managing contribution claims in the
securities field. These proponents therefore argue that prohibit-
ing contribution in antitrust cases to prevent further complica-
tion is unwarranted.
arise ... from the fact that joint defense efforts, with their savings in court, staff, and
attorney time, would be hindered or deterred altogether.").
110. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
111. See Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1190 (Hanson, J., dissenting) ("The chilling
effect on the incentive to bring or pursue a lawsuit is unlikely to be diminished by the
mere possibility of the favorable uses of distinct court discretion."); see also El Camino
Glass Co. v. Sunglo Glass Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,112 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
28, 1976).
112. See supra note 16.
113. See supra note 110.
114. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
Commentators have suggested that because of the similarity of issues between the plain-
tiffs primary suit and the defendant's allegations that additional parties participated in
the same illegal conduct, a consolidated trial is preferable. See Jacboson, supra note 12;
Sullivan, supra note 4.
115. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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THE SECURITIES ANALOGY
Background
As proponents of an antitrust contribution rule point out, con-
tribution is authorized under the securities laws. Both the Securi-
ties Act of 1933116 and the Exchange Act of 19341 7 included
contribution provisions when initially enacted." 8 Despite the
continued availability of contribution, however, only recently
have contribution claims been asserted with any regularity in
the securities field.
Two reasons are given for the dearth of early securities cases
in which contribution was at issue. First, only three sections of
the securities laws expressly authorized contribution, and these
sections were seldom used to assert liability." 9 Second, courts
had consistently recognized and enforced contractual indemnity
agreements by which parties potentially liable under the securi-
ties laws could prearrange shifts in liability. 20 Contribution
claims did not begin to surface until the enforceability of indem-
nity agreements was rejected, 121 and the courts became willing
to imply a right of contribution under more widely used liability
provisions.2 2
116. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976).
117. Id. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b).
118. For a general background and discussion of the legislative history of the contri-
bution provisions, see Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1256.
119. The specific statutory provisions authorizing contribution include: § 11 of the
Securities Act, which imposes liability for misrepresentations in connection with registra-
tion statements, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976); § 9(e) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits
manipulation of securities on the stock exchanges, id. § 78i(e); and § 18(b) of the
Exchange Act, which proscribes misleading statements in connection with registration
documents, id. § 78r(b).
120. See Note, supra note 118 at 1270-72.
121. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (Globus I)
(court refused to enforce indemnity agreement where both parties were found liable of
willful misconduct, on public policy grounds. The Second Circuit affirmed the opinion in
all respects except for the award of punitive damages).
122. See, e.g., Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,468 (2d Cir. 1982); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,919 (5th Cir. 1981); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330
(7th Cir. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(Securities Act of 1933, §§ 12(2), 17(a)); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F.
Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a)). See generally Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In
Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L REv. 597 (1972).
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The early contribution cases in the securities area dealt with
whether contribution might be implied for particular securities
violations. 123 Cases also arose which questioned the availability
of contribution for certain willful or intentional violations.124
Thus, the courts delineated circumstances under which contribu-
tion was appropriate, but did not initially develop the guidelines
necessary to handle such claims.
Procedural Treatment of Contribution Claims
An examination of securities cases in which contribution has
been asserted reveals no set pattern of procedural treatment of
such claims. Some courts have accepted the argument that third-
party contribution claims are improper because they antedate a
finding of joint liability. 25 More commonly, however, third-party
claims for contribution, filed in the principal suit, have been
readily permitted. 26
Some courts have not only permitted third-party complaints
seeking contribution, but have encouraged them. Separate pro-
ceedings for contribution, in which the original defendant must
prove the existence of a common liability to the plaintiff that he
123. See, e.g., Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Law Research Serv.,
Inc. v. Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (Globus II) (contribution implied under § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Sherlee
Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 93,749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933).
124. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974) (contri-
bution is available under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 even though the
provision reaches deliberately deceptive as well as negligent conduct).
125. In Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Law Research Serv., Inc. v.
Blair & Co., 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (Globus II), the court refused to consider contribution
claims against non-parties, when brought by means of a post-trial motion, because the
third parties had not been adjudged jointly liable during the trial. In subsequent cases,
defendants cited Globus II for the proposition that contribution claims, in general, are
premature absent an existing judgment of joint liability. See Liggett & Myers Inc. v.
Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co.,
366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
126. See, e.g., Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 958-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 permits contribution claims by third-party complaint); Liggett &
Myers Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Fact that contribution
is premised on joint liability does not mean that a joint judgment is a prerequisite before
such claims may be entertained. The policy goals of the securities laws are adequately
served where contribution is sought in an original proceeding).
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or she shares with others, might result in inconsistent verdicts
based on identical facts. 127 Accordingly, the cases suggest that a
single proceeding in which all parties to an alleged scheme are
before the court is preferable despite additional complexity. 128
Securities cases have also addressed the threat of possible
prejudice to the original plaintiff in connection with contribution
claims. One court denied leave to file a third-party complaint
seeking contribution on the ground that prejudice to the plaintiff
would result. 129 This denial, however, has been criticized as
unduly harsh.130 Later courts concluded that a better means to
deal with potential prejudice is severance of the contribution
claims. 31 Separate trails do, however, carry the danger of poten-
tially inconsistent verdicts. 32
One commentator recommends that a single proceeding should
be utilized whenever possible.' 33 Severance pursuant to rule 42(b)
should be exercised only where numerous parties or exceedingly
complex issues create a genuine likelihood of an unfair burden to
the original plaintiff. 3 4 Very few securities cases which have
included contribution claims involve that degree of complexity.
Most impleader requests concern one or two additional parties. 35
Consequently, the court's discretionary severance power has
been infrequently invoked.
127. See State Mutual Life Assurance Co. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 63 F.R.D. 389,
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (severance of a "cross-claim for contribution would subject [a party]
to possibly differing verdicts on the same facts before two different juries").
128. See Note, supra note 118, at 1289.
129. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEG. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,810, at 95,766 (D. Md. 1966) (third-party complaint, which would necessi-
tate substantial repetition of past discovery and proliferate the issues involved, would
subject the original plaintiff to substantial expense and delay).
130. A direct criticism of the Johns Hopkins holding is found in C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1443, at 211-12 (1971).
131. See, e.g., Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,749, at 93,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting the Wright &
Miller criticism, supra note 130, the court allowed the defendants' third-party complaint,
but also granted the plaintiff's motion for a separate trial of the contribution issues).
132. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
133. See Note, supra note 118, at 1285-89.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (in suit
by purchaser against broker, the issuing corporation and the issuer's accounting firm
were impleaded for contribution claims); but see Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, [1966-
1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,810, at 95,766 (D. Md. 1966) (the
desired third-party complaint named only one additional party, but raised numerous new
and complex issues).
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One final aspect of contribution claims in the securities area
involves claims against settling defendants. Courts have gener-
ally allowed contribution against settling defendants where the
settling party paid less than a fair share of the total liability. 36
ANALYSIS: APPLICABILITY OF THE SECURITIES ANALOGY
Proponents of a contribution rule for antitrust defendants
point to the presence of contribution under the securities laws to
counter warnings of increased complexity.13 7 An examination of
contribution claims in the securities field, however, reveals that
such an analogy may be inappropriate for several reasons.
First, while the antitrust and securities laws both impose joint
liability on those who violate their provisions, the illegal conduct
proscribed by each area of law is quite distinct.'38 The grava-
men of a securities law violation is wrongful or deceptive con-
duct in connection with a sale or purchase of securities. 139 Con-
tribution claims brought under the securities laws arise out of
some common wrongdoing to a plaintiff; the party seeking con-
tribution must demonstrate that the third party participated in
the wrongful acts, but the tortious conduct need not be precisely
the same.140 Under the antitrust laws, however, concerted activ-
ity, the conspiracy, is the gist of the violation.' 4 ' An antitrust
defendant seeking contribution from a third party would be
alleging that the third party participated in the precise conspir-
acy that underlies his own liability.142 Accordingly, the distinc-
tion between common liability under the securities laws, and
joint liability under the antitrust laws could affect the ease with
136. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974); Alt-
man v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Note, supra note 118, at
1292-1303.
137. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
138. The phrase "joint liability" may be misleading in that it encompasses both con-
certed wrongful activity, and a common liability arising from a series of negligent acts
that cause a single harm. See Leflar, supra note 4, at 131 n.9. For purposes of discussion,
references in the text to joint liability are limited to actual concerted activity among
wrongdoers. The term "common liability" will be used to describe those situations where
a series of negligent actors share responsibility for a resulting wrong.
139. See generally FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 104 (Oct. 13, 1982).
140. See Note, supra note 118, at 1287 n.182 (explaining that judicial use of the term
"joint liability" in securities cases has been in reference to liability in the broadest sense
and does not suggest actual concerted activity on the part of defendants).
141. See L. SuIvAN supra note 1, §§ 108-109.
142. See Cellini, supra note 108, at 1600-01.
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which multiple defendants can coordinate defense efforts.
In the securities field, because identical conduct is not at issue,
defendants and third parties might be willing to postpone the
allocation of their respective liabilities until the plaintiffs have
proved that some common duty has been breached. 143 In the
antitrust area, once the plaintiff establishes a conspiracy, a
defendant is effectively admitting his guilt in seeking contribu-
tion from additional parties.144 The resulting precarious position
for antitrust defendants will likely preclude willing cooperation
among defendants, resulting in additional litigation time and
expense for all parties involved.
Second, the conspiratorial nature of many antitrust violations,
and the fact that such practices often exist industry-wide, imply
a far greater number of potential third parties in antitrust cases
than in securities cases. 145 While it is not uncommon for anti-
trust plaintiffs to name multiple defendants, substantial compli-
cations could result if yet additional parties were brought before
the court through third-party contribution claims. In contrast,
contribution claims asserted under the securities laws have not,
generally, greatly expanded the scope of the original lawsuit.146
Finally, unlimited impleader in antitrust cases may potentially
alter or modify the plaintiffs theory of his case. For example, a
plaintiff alleging a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy could be
forced to address different substantive rules of law if a defendant
were to allege, through a contribution claim, that parties in dif-
ferent positions in the distribution chain were part of the conspir-
acy.1 47 Commentators have suggested that such a result is
143. See Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (44 defendants agreed to postpone their contribution and indemnity claims until
after the plaintiff successfully established a securities violation).
144. See Cellini, supra note 108, at 1600-01.
145. See supra note 1.
146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147. Differing legal analyses apply to antitrust conspiracies depending on the nature
of the restraint alleged, and whether the participants occupy only one level on a distribu-
tion chain (a horizontal conspiracy) or several levels (a vertical conspiracy). Restraints of
trade imposed by means of a horizontal conspiracy are generally subject to a per se
illegality rule. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-23 (1940) (a
combination of competitors "formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate com-
merce is illegal per se"). Under a per se rule, the plaintiff need only prove the existence of
the illegal agreement; the courts do not require proof of a resulting anticompetitive effect.
See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("there are certain agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
19831
600 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 14
improbable because federal procedural rules limit third-party
complaints to potential liability suggested by the plaintiffs
claim.148 The current legislative proposal for contribution carries
no such limitation, however, in explicitly authorizing third-party
claims for contribution. 149 The availability of contribution under
the securities laws offers no analogy in this regard.
CONCLUSION
The above distinctions between substantive antitrust and
securities law suggest that reliance on procedural similarities is
insufficient to support the establishment of an antitrust contri-
bution rule because such basis does not adequately address the
complexity issues involved. Given congressional commitment to
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use").
Vertical restraints, however, are usually tested under a rule of reason approach; the
plaintiff must demonstrate the actual anticompetitive effects of the challenged restraint
by introducing economic evidence on the relevant product market. See Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("[Tjhe true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that ques-
tion, the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business...; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual and probable."). Consequently, characterization of a challenged restraint as horiz-
ontal or vertical, depending on the market position occupied by the alleged co-conspirators,
will determine the plaintiffs burden of proof. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 1,
§§ 65-72.
While both horizontal and vertical price restraints have been traditionally analyzed
under a per se rule, there is a current movement toward treating all vertical restraints,
including price restraints, under a rule of reason analysis. See Posner, The Next Step in
the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L.J. 6, 8-14
(1981). Should the courts embrace this suggested approach, the proposed contribution bill
might operate to shift a plaintiffs burden of proof even though applicable only in price-
fixing cases.
148. See Rose, Contribution in Antitrust: Some Policy Considerations, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1605, 1620 (1979).
149. See supra note 79, § 41(a).
The validity of procedural rules that are included in a federal statutory scheme, but
which are inconsistent with the established Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is unclear.
Generally, the Federal Rules have the effect of statute and apply in all civil matters
brought in the federal courts. Where Congress demonstrates clear intent that inconsistent
procedural rules are to apply, however, the Federal Rules are inapplicable. See C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1023 (1971) (inconsistent notice
requirements present in the federal patent laws govern in patent proceedings). The anti-
trust contribution proposal currently under consideration is silent as to whether its more
liberal third-party claims language is intended to supersede rule 14.
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the passage of an antitrust contribution measure, 150 immediate
attention should be directed toward realistically appraising
potential complications while the contours of a contribution rule
are still being formulated. The securities analogy may be one
consideration, but the distinctions should be noted and addressed.
The complexity issue warrants serious inquiry so that the result-
ing proposal reflects due consideration of consequential problems
as well as any motivating inequities.
LAURA J. LODAWER
150. See supra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
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